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In a step toward more economic and environmentally sustainable decision-making, this paper in-
troduces transaction cost economics as a promising paradigm for revealing the cost-effectiveness 
of resilient infrastructure investments. Transaction cost economics is a theory and methodol-
ogy for comparatively evaluating the cost-effectiveness of institutional arrangements governing 
transactions. Transaction cost theory was formulated to explain the economics of concessions and 
other forms of organization for delivering infrastructure goods and services. Research designs in 
transaction cost analysis are comparative, emphasizing the accumulated costs over time of one 
approach compared to another. Organizing research around comparative production and transac-
tion costs, instead of price, creates an opportunity to internalize externalities, such as ecosystem 
services, into ex post evaluations of historical investment and ex ante analyses of alternative fu-
ture development plans.
Resilience theory provides a framework for applying analytical techniques to anticipate the effects 
of disturbances. Notions of resilience express the idea that the natural world is dynamic, highly 
specific, and ever-changing. In contrast, we build things that are static, standardized, and unable 
to adapt to either forces of nature or deliberate acts of destruction. Buildings and infrastructure 
are designed to tolerate a limited set of disturbances; when stressed beyond those limits, struc-
tures are subject to degradation and collapse. Evaluations of infrastructure investments today 
should take account of the cost of repeated cycles of investment and collapse over the long term. 
If applied to measure and remedy the costs of disturbances over time, transaction cost economic 
methodologies may form the basis for evaluating infrastructure projects for resilience, opening 
the possibility of recognizing economic and environmental co-benefits in infrastructure invest-
ments.
KEywoRDS: Resilience, Economics, Infrastructure, Transaction Cost, Governance, Adaptive 
Management, Evaluation, Collective Choice, Sustainable Development, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
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1. InTRoDuCTIon
Our systems of infrastructure exist as vast networks of 
investment that underpin the urbanization of the landscape. 
These systems, for energy, water, transport, communication, 
waste, and myriad other collective goods, sit at the interface 
of ecosystems and human settlements, and their design and 
operation are thus central to the path-dependent relationship 
humans have with the natural environment. For better or 
worse, our infrastructure commands the stores and flows of 
elements in nature we find most vital and most toxic, and give 
both our economic systems of production and consumption 
a platform for performance. If our cities and their urbanizing 
edges are to be sustainable, it will be in large part due to the 
environmental performance of our infrastructure systems.
Despite considerable sunk cost over the past 150 years in 
environmentally damaging investments, from the combustion 
engine and its fuels to our concrete ribbons of highways, 
flooded valleys behind earthen dams, hardened water 
conveyances, spiderwebs of overhead wiring, overflowing 
sewers, and piling of waste on land and at sea, the notion that 
our infrastructure is critical to environmental performance 
should provide us with reason for optimism. Unlike the 
decentralized governance of markets for most commodities, 
infrastructure systems are often centrally managed, 
standardized in design, and governed with relatively broad 
concern for the public interest. As such, seemingly minor 
institutional changes to standards for infrastructure design 
and operation can have significant effect on environmental 
performance. Douglass North (1990) suggests that changes to 
the “rules of the game” offer the hope of massively increasing 
returns. Changes to the path of infrastructure production can 
offer hope of massively increasing returns to environmental 
sustainability.
The multiple models and arguments for sustainable 
development in this journal are testament to the need for an 
analytical framework that can support the hard pragmatic 
and scientific work to be done to discern the attributes of 
infrastructure systems on a sustainable path from those that 
are not. Changes to the institutional arrangements that govern 
infrastructure systems demand empirical evidence of both 
environmental and economic outcomes if decision-makers 
are to be persuaded to adopt or replicate environmentally 
positive attributes. In our opinion, the scientific approaches 
conceptualized by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) and Ronald 
Coase (1937, 1960) in transaction cost economics, if applied to 
evaluate infrastructure within the framework of C.S. Holling’s 
(1973, 1996) notion of resilience, can account for the trade-
offs in a meaningful way.
Transaction cost economics is a theory and methodology 
used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of institutional 
arrangements. This theory emerged from Coase’s explanation 
of the origin of the firm, and found purchase in Williamson’s 
articulation of the idea that organizational forms exist to 
economize on transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975, 1985). The theory made significant headway through 
debates amongst economists on the merits of franchise 
bidding for natural monopoly (Williamson, 1976; Demsetz, 
1968; Goldberg, 1976; Coase, 1959). Unlike neoclassical 
models of price and quantity, transaction cost economic 
models presume that most economic action resides in 
adaptation to change over time, and come with research 
methods that offer opportunities to internalize externalities 
in analyses of costs. Resilience theory, on the other hand, 
provides a framework for applying analytical techniques 
to anticipate the long-term effects of disturbances on 
ecosystems. Resilience is increasingly salient to the design of 
infrastructure systems, especially systems thought to protect 
human settlements from disaster and climate change. We 
argue that together, these micro-analytical methods can 
be harnessed to evaluate alternative urban infrastructure 
investments and their institutional arrangements, with both 
economic and environmental sustainability in mind. 
For example, if transaction cost economic analyses were to 
include the long-term historical ex post cost of infrastructure 
systems, especially those subject to repeated cycles of 
disaster and reconstruction, the long-term cost savings 
available through alternative institutional arrangements 
would become evident. Rail corridors subject to repeated 
landslides, highway sections subject to repeated inundation 
from floods, and levees and other embankments that undergo 
repeated repair and renovation, for example, may be viewed 
as more cost-effective in an alternative form, mode, or 
location. Infrastructure investments also induce land use 
change. In the case of sea level rise threatening coastal 
assets, or the increasing severity of natural or man-made 
disasters, the cost effects of alternatives intended to protect 
property should take into account the cost of disasters at risk 
of occurring within the designed life of the facility.  To do so 
may open discussions over changes in property markets and 
property rights that may be less palatable in the short-term, 
but of long-term economic interest.
If such analyses were to fold in the ex post costs and third 
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party impacts associated with environmental assets, feedback 
loops between infrastructure and ecosystem services would 
be given economic value, and the long-term savings available 
through alternative institutional arrangements for the 
governance of environmental assets would become evident. 
When planners and ecologists contemplate the long-term 
implications of restoring wetlands as overflows and buffers to 
avoid levee breaches and associated damage from floods, this 
is the type of data that has the potential to demonstrate the 
economic, as well as environmental appeal of this alternative, 
more sustainable form of infrastructure investment.
In this article, we suggest that transaction cost economic 
analysis and resilience are compatible theories for evaluating 
infrastructure decision-making, and present a generalized 
procedural model for integrating their micro-analytic 
approaches.
2. TRanSaCTIon CoST EConomICS: noT 
youR TypICal nEoClaSSICal ThEoRy
To transact is to do business, as in the completion of a trade 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). Transaction cost economics 
takes the transaction to be the basic unit of analysis, and asks 
how transactions are governed. As Williamson says,
Transaction cost economics poses the prob-
lem of economic organization as a problem 
of contracting. A particular task is to be ac-
complished. It can be organized in any of 
several alternative ways. Explicit or implicit 
contract and support apparatus are associ-
ated with each. What are the costs? (1985: 20)
Coase (1937) realized that parties involved in trade experience 
costs that are not captured in the prices or production costs 
of goods. Previous economic literature asked how prices were 
determined, attributing problematic outcomes to the nature 
of the goods or markets in which they were traded (e.g. Smith, 
1937; Pigou, 1920). When attention is turned away from price 
and toward transactions, research recognizes that costs are 
generated in the formation of contracts, are ongoing with the 
execution of contracts, and exist in addition to expenditures 
made with an economically functioning price mechanism 
(Coase, 1993). Williamson explains,
Transaction costs of ex ante and ex post 
types are usefully distinguished. The first 
are the costs of drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement. This can be 
done with a great deal of care, in which case 
a complex document is drafted in which nu-
merous contingencies are recognized, and 
appropriate adaptations by the parties are 
stipulated and agreed to in advance. Or the 
document can be very incomplete, the gaps 
to be filled in by the parties as the contin-
gencies arise. (1985: 2)
For many commodities, transactions are easy to enter and exit 
and the parties may be either satisfied that their expectations 
were met or comfortable looking for the next best alternative 
(Macneil, 1974; Williamson, 2000). However, in transactions 
between consumers and producers of networked infrastructure 
(e.g. transport, water, waste, and communications) experience 
and research lead us to be concerned about what happens 
over time, before and after a contract is signed (e.g. Troesken, 
2001, 2006). Contracts for infrastructure services, whether 
between public and private agents on behalf of consumers 
or directly between consumers and producers, tend to be 
complex and relatively long-lasting agreements, coupled 
with significant investments by consumers and producers in 
durable goods. We also recognize these as essential goods 
and services and, in the fashion of natural monopoly, their 
geographic distribution or market concentration can leave 
consumers without reasonable alternatives or substitutes. 
Transaction cost economics is well-suited to the economics of 
infrastructure goods and services, especially when research is 
focused on the factors that cause the cost of transactions to 
rise ex post. Parties may enter agreements that appear to align 
with their interests, but economic issues can arise at any time, 
from forces exogenous and endogenous to the transaction. 
Costs rise as the parties find themselves unable to adapt to 
these changing circumstances. As Williamson says, 
Ex post costs of contracting take several 
forms. These include (1) the maladapta-
tion costs incurred when transactions drift 
out of alignment . . . (2) the haggling costs 
incurred if bilateral efforts are made to cor-
rect ex post misalignments, (3) the setup 
and running costs associated with the gov-
ernance structures (often not the courts) 
to which disputes are referred, and (4) the 
bonding costs of effecting secure commit-
ments. (1985: 21)
Alignment refers to the balancing of interests and incentives 
that the parties operate with as they craft and carry out their 
agreements. Misalignment is the failure of either the parties 
or the institutional arrangements governing the transaction to 
strike a proper balance of interests and incentives between the 
parties (Aoki, 1983). Inefficiency results, reflected in elevated 
bargaining costs, disputes, or other factors that impede the 
cost-efficient execution of the transaction (Williamson, 1985). 
Thus, misalignment suggests that the contracts parties use 
to govern their exchange are more expensive to execute than 
they should be or that the contracts or other institutional 
structures governing the transaction do not adequately 
safeguard the parties’ interests (Macneil, 1974). Collectively, 
these are examples of contractual hazards that can emerge 
ex post, after a contract has been signed and any economizing 
effects from competition have faded away.
Williamson’s idea that institutional arrangements economize 
by allowing the parties to avoid or recover efficiently from 
misalignment and maladaptation is based on a game-theoretic 
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conception of economic action and, in this sense, it mirrors 
Elinor Ostrom’s (1990; Ostrom et al., 1994) understanding of 
the potential economizing effects of institutional arrangements 
governing common pool resources. Like Cournot (1838) and 
Nash (1951, 1953), however, Williamson attends to the human 
behaviors that lead people away from the economizing effects 
of cooperation, while Ostrom attends to the behaviors that 
foster cooperation. 
The temporal nature of the game is central to transaction cost 
economic reasoning. Williamson assumes that people are 
rational, but they cannot anticipate everything that will happen 
(Simon, 1986). Contracts for complex transactions cannot 
be expected to cover all events that occur as the transaction 
proceeds. Williamson (2002) also assumes that people are 
opportunistic in that they may, but do not always take advantage 
of one another. Thus strategic behavior can also lead to 
costly contractual breakdowns. These assumptions render 
all complex contracts unavoidably incomplete. Furthermore, 
although performance is expected to be tied to incentives, 
such as payoffs and punishments (North, 2005: 18), people 
are challenged to learn and verify performance ex post, under 
conditions that may be fraught with information asymmetry 
(Coase, 1960).
Empirical analysis in transaction cost economics compares 
actual ex post costs and consequences for the parties to 
exchange during transactions over time, with the hypothesis 
that efficiency results from the discriminating alignment of 
transactions with alternative, more efficient structures of 
governance (Williamson, 2002). The theory gains predictive 
content by naming the key ways in which transactions differ, 
describing the economic properties of alternative structures 
of governance, and measuring the costs parties experienced 
as they carried out comparable transactions under alternative 
structures of governance (Tadelis & Williamson, 2012). 
Originally applied to the “make or buy” decision in infrastructure 
and commodity markets (Shelanski & Klein, 1995; LaFontaine 
& Slade, 2007), the theory and its practical implications extend 
to the public sector (Williamson, 1999; Spiller, 2008), or virtually 
any situation in which two or more different arrangements may 
be used to govern the same transaction.
While already used to measure the economic consequences 
of infrastructure investments, we believe a transaction 
cost approach can also be used to measure environmental 
consequences. We are only limited in our ability to derive useful 
transaction cost accounts of investments by our ability to see the 
extent to which the environmental effects of those investments, 
whether damaging or sustainable, occur as transactions.
3. a ThEoRy uSEful whEn aSSETS aRE 
SpECIfIC To ThE TRanSaCTIon aT hanD
Williamson takes particular interest in costs that accrue when 
parties become locked in to a bilateral dependent relationship. 
One key factor he identifies is “asset specificity”, a term for 
assets specific to the transaction at hand, defined as 
specialized physical assets (such as a die 
for stamping out distinctive metal shapes), 
specialized human assets (that arise from 
firm-specific training or learning by doing), 
site specificity (specialization by proximity), 
dedicated assets (large discrete investments 
made in expectation of continuing business, 
the premature termination of which busi-
ness would result in product being sold at 
distress prices) or brand-name capital. (2002: 
176)
Asset specificity gives rise to bilateral dependency because 
when assets are specific to the transaction, buyers find it cost-
prohibitive to turn to alternative sources of supply, and sellers 
cannot redeploy the same assets to alternative uses or users 
without incurring a loss in value (Klein et al., 1978). Bilateral 
dependency suggests that parties to an exchange may not 
find it easy to exit their agreement. Locked in, the parties may 
be situated for intensive bargaining against one another for 
maximum gain over incremental ex post change. 
Infrastructure and ecosystems are generally site-specific. 
As mentioned above, infrastructure systems consist of site-
specific durable assets, often complemented by site-specific 
or durable investments on the part of consumers in order to 
gain the benefits of the infrastructure service. Environmental 
assets also tend to be site-specific. For instance, many 
species evolve according to geographic conditions, resulting in 
specialization by location (Darwin, 1859). Indeed, the collective 
features of ecosystems may be unique to their location; not 
all expectations of what may be found at a given site can be 
predicted from general accounts of the features and functions 
provided in typologies of ecosystems.1 As habitats grow scarce 
and become increasingly isolated, islands of biodiversity in a 
transformed landscape, the chances that an environmental 
asset will be site-specific to a transaction will grow. Endangered 
species, for instance, have site-specific habitats, and the odds 
of population viability are expected to decline with the erosion 
of the environmental integrity of their habitat.
If mindful of the site-specificity of environmental assets, a 
transaction cost economic approach could factor in costs 
from damage to these assets as a result of the transaction. 
Ecosystem service valuation offers one means to measure, 
in economic terms, the environmental assets at stake. A 
transaction cost approach could also draw attention to the 
possible misalignment of the interest parties have in the 
environmental assets affected by or valued in transactions, 
and provide the means to systematically account for ex post 
maladaptation when damage occurs or positive spillovers result 
1 This is not to say that ecosystem functions cannot or should not be generalized 
and given economic value; it just says that the features of ecosystems are 
likely more rich, varied, and irreplaceable than the functions we can measure 
and account for in the valuation of ecosystem services at any given site. As 
Holling (1996) suggests, the spatial attributes of ecosystems are patchy and 
discontinuous, and abiotic and biotic processes and variables control the 
patchiness of ecosystems, but do so across a range of scales, and in cycles 
that function at a number of scales. In our opinion, these features complicate 
but do not detract from the need to ascribe value to ecosystem services, 
and thus render these assets on par with the local assets decision-makers 
routinely value through investments in the built environment.  
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from infrastructure goods and services. Environmental or not, 
assets specific to transactions pose hazards that can raise 
costs for one or more parties to the exchange and, Williamson 
(1985) cautions, governance structures should safeguard the 
parties against opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality.2 
If current arrangements do not adequately safeguard the 
interests of the parties, alternative institutional arrangements 
may be warranted.
The research questions guiding transaction cost economic 
analysis have often centered on the question of which form of 
contract to use to govern a given transaction. Williamson (2002: 
183) uses a schema (Figure 1) to explain that, when economic 
exchange involves an asset specific to the transaction (k), 
this can pose a hazard to the contracting parties which, 
unless relieved through a safeguard (s) offered in the form 
of a credible commitment in the contract or a hierarchical 
arrangement – an employment agreement, with the firm as 
a hierarchical organization – the parties will be exposed to 
the hazards that drive up ex post costs. Empirical analyses 
usually sit within this theoretical framework for economic 
organization, which distinguishes governance structures, from 
the simple, spot market exchange, to long-term contracts, to 
the private firm, to the public bureau, for the ways in which they 
safeguard the parties in transactions (e.g. Williamson 1975, 
1985). To economize, more complex governance structures are 
reserved for more hazardous transactions. By the same token, 
institutional arrangements that fail to safeguard the interests 
of the parties, or that are excessive in their effort to govern, 
should be found to be uneconomical, especially if alternative 









Figure 1: Simple contracting schema.  
Source: Williamson (2002: 183)
2 Opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality are the human behavioral 
assumptions of transaction cost economic theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
The idea that humans behave opportunistically with regard to ecological 
systems and processes has been widely acknowledged by writers in 
disciplines across the natural and social sciences; this tension could be said 
to be driving research in urban ecology toward an interdisciplinary synthesis 
(Alberti, 2008). Bounded rationality is the generally accepted assumption 
from Herbert Simon (1986) that humans have several limitations that prevent 
us from achieving the optimal states of decision-making previously assumed 
in neoclassical economics and more applied disciplines, such as urban 
planning. Bounds to rationality are especially evident in game-theoretic 
settings with environmental consequences, such as the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968). 
Figure 1 depicts forms of contract for safeguarding the 
interests of producers and consumers as they carry out 
economic exchange, differentiating exchanges that may 
include transaction-specific assets, such as infrastructure 
investments, from those that do not. The schema can be 
extended to include the role of the public sector (Williamson, 
1999) and the various contractual arrangements public 
organizations use to manage or regulate markets, including 
markets for land (Alexander, 2001). The same schema can 
be extended to describe hazards to ecosystem functions, and 
the various institutional arrangements that firms, non-profit 
organizations, planners, and public managers use to govern 
them.3
4. InTERnalIzIng EnvIRonmEnTal 
ExTERnalITIES wITh TRanSaCTIon 
CoSTS 
The idea that exchange between two parties, irrespective of 
price, can raise costs for people external to the exchange is 
one of the founding principles of transaction cost economics. 
As Coase (1937, 1960) reasoned, costs above and beyond 
the price mechanism can explain the origin of the firm, and 
although pollution and other environmental costs to society 
are costs above and beyond the price mechanism, they are 
also the product of market exchange. Williamson suggests 
that empirical tests examine the “comparative costs of 
planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under 
alternative governance structures” (1985: 2). By this logic, 
research designs can and should be arranged to account for 
environmental as well as economic costs. Costs experienced 
by third parties deserve just as much examination as costs 
experienced by the two parties engaged in market exchange.
Consider the Coasian (1960) problem of transactions in 
the marketplace, governed by institutions, that create 
undesirable – indeed, uneconomical – external effects. Coase 
provided several examples, from the case of cattle grazing on 
a neighbor’s crops, to the case of machinery at a confectionary 
disturbing the work of a neighboring doctor, to the case of a 
factory polluting the air or water of a community. By his line 
of reasoning, these external effects are transactions, and 
may be subject to the same sort of transaction cost analysis 
we apply to transactions that are internal to markets (i.e. 
“internal” simply because they are priced and presumably 
voluntary exchanges).4
The simplest of transaction cost empirical tests is the 
3 This theoretical framework could focus entirely on ecosystem functions, such 
that the prototypical exchange is nothing more than the collection of abiotic 
and biotic processes and variables understood as a functioning ecosystem, 
and the safeguards are comprised of the various practices and regulatory 
instruments used to protect ecosystems. Alternatively, we are suggesting 
that the prototypical exchange could consist of coupled human-natural 
systems, and array governance structures for the means and relative extent 
to which they safeguard the long-term viability of coupled human-natural 
systems.
4 One could argue that such externalities, which we recognize as “nuisances”, 
provide justification for zoning, and similar urban planning tools. 
Infrastructure investments have similar rationales and effects. We invest in 
them to promote economic development, but we also invest in them to reduce 
exposure to numerous natural and human hazards, and they are critical 
components of long-range plans for urban development.
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comparative measure of the real costs of completing one type 
of transaction under two different institutional arrangements 
(e.g. Williamson, 1976; Whittington, 2012). Holding constant 
the attributes of the transaction, such as the nature or design 
of the good or service to be delivered, allows research to search 
for the economic effects of alternative forms of contract, or 
other institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements 
consist of informal norms, formal rules, and enforcement 
characteristics, understood to varying degrees for the 
economic, political and social order they provide (North, 2005: 
48). In comparing the sum of production and transaction costs 
for transactions under alternative governance structures, 
research can reveal the relative economic effects of these 
instruments.5 
To learn how any given transaction generates costs, one 
would disaggregate the tasks involved in executing the 
transaction and account for the costs as they accrue with each 
task. In the market for infrastructure development, the same 
general tasks can be found from sector to sector: planning, 
finance, land acquisition, design, construction, operations, 
maintenance, and rehabilitation or improvement.6 Alternative 
institutional arrangements exist for governing these tasks; 
which call for more or less involvement from various public 
organizations, private firms, and non-profit organizations. 
Empirical transaction cost analysis usually takes a keen 
interest in the relative cost-effectiveness of these governance 
structures for any given transaction. 
For example, in her comparative analysis of two modes of 
governance for constructing highway intersections, Whittington 
(2012) explains transaction cost empirical investigation by 
disaggregating construction into tasks, and comparing the 
ex post costs that accrued to the public agency for the tasks 
performed by private firms over time, on two completed projects, 
each delivered with a different form of contract (Figure 2). The 
projects were selected to control for design, quality, and scale, 
and this research design allowed the elevated construction cost 
for one of the projects to be attributed to the form of contract 
selected to govern that project. 
Whittington’s study focused on the exchange between the 
public agency and the producer of the infrastructure project. 
To learn how transactions bring about external environmental 
costs – costs that economists ascribe to third parties – one 
would account for those costs as they accrue as well. Line 
items, akin to those generated in ex post analyses of costs 
and benefits, could be generated that specify the ecosystem 
5 If, in research, one has reason to believe that the cost of producing the good 
equates to the price of the good, then research can focus on transaction 
costs. If, as in most infrastructure goods and services, researchers are 
challenged to discover the relationship between production cost and price, 
then the values that matter are the sum total of production and transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1991).
6 The same is true for the development of land; land use change usually 
involves a series of routine transactions, each comprised of a set of tasks 
carried out by various parties (Alexander, 2001).
service values lost, spared, or restored.7 Thus research could 
internalize environmental externalities by recognizing and 
valuing the interests parties have in environmental assets, 
accounting for ex post costs associated with environmental 
assets, and recognizing the burden each party bears in the 
form of ex post costs. 
By this process, transaction cost analysis could be used to 
comparatively analyze the environmental, as well as economic, 
consequences of historic investments in infrastructure 
goods and services. Infrastructure and ecosystem assets 
are, however, assets with very long designed and natural 
lifespans. We run the risk of truncating research, missing 
what may be valuable environmental effects, by trying to 
account for costs while limiting analysis to the time of 
construction, or a given period for a concession agreement to 
govern an infrastructure investment. The theory of resilience 
offers a frame of reference that may help alleviate temporal 













































































112th Street Thurston Way
Figure 2: Construction cost accounts for transaction cost 
analysis of the 112th Street (bid-build) and the Thurston Way 
(design-build) projects. Source: Whittington (2012: 278)
7 As the science of transaction cost economics progresses, researchers 
aggregate and compare costs in larger samples, coupled with multiple 
variations in institutional arrangements. The promise of this line of research 
is that patterns of cost may emerge that make it possible for economic 
theorists to develop formal mathematical models, and test predictions made 
with those models (Williamson, 2007).


























5. RESIlIEnCE aS a ThEoRy of CouplED 
human-naTuRal SySTEmS
The term ‘resilience’ was first developed by physicists to 
describe objects that rebound, recoil, or spring back (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2013). The term also describes objects 
that can resume their original shape after they are bent or 
subjected to some type of strain.
Ecologists have since developed a coherent theory around 
the concept of resilience (Gunderson et al., 2009). In ecology, 
resilience is one of several possible properties that a group 
of organisms can have in an environment when all elements 
are thought of together, as a system (Holling, 1973). When 
ecologists study interactions between predators and prey, 
they ask themselves why species go extinct. When speaking 
of resilience, they ask why species persist – what are the 
conditions that allow groups of organisms to persist, despite 
exposure to destabilizing forces? This line of reasoning leads 
ecologists toward the study of all the plausible types and 
magnitudes of disturbances for any given population in an 
ecosystem, and to conduct empirical research that suggests 
how that population has responded or may respond, over 
time, to any given disturbance. 
Urban ecologists, noting the degree of and quickening pace 
with which urbanization has altered the world’s ecosystems, as 
well as the absolute dependence humans have on the function 
of ecosystems, describe cities as complex ecological systems 
dominated by humans (Alberti, 2008; Alberti & Marzluff, 
2004). Viewed as part and parcel of complex, adaptive, and 
therefore self-organizing systems, humans are one of many 
species simultaneously interacting and adapting to change 
over time. Consistent with ecological principles, resilience in 
the examination of coupled human-natural systems asks how 
much alteration urban ecosystems can tolerate, before they 
are reorganized around new structures and new processes 
(Holling, 1973, 1996). As Alberti and Marzluff (2004) explain,
…in urbanizing regions complex interac-
tions between human and ecosystem 
functions over multiple scales affect re-
silience. These complex interactions need 
to be included in studying such systems. 
Simply considering human and ecosystem 
functions separately may not be adequate 
to understand system resilience because 
integrated socio-economic and ecological 
systems can behave differently than their 
separate parts. Furthermore, since urban 
development patterns affect the amount 
and pattern of built and natural land cover, 
as well as human use of ecosystem services 
in urban ecosystems, we argue that alter-
native urban patterns (i.e. urban form, land 
use distribution, and connectivity) have dif-
ferential effects on resilience. (2004: 242)
Thus, infrastructure investments and land use policies are 
– along with population, economic growth, topography, and 
climate – driving forces in the creation of patterns of land 
use and land cover change (Alberti, 2008). The patterns 
that emerge across the landscape can be described as 
precipitating events, with resulting impacts on biophysical 
and socio-economic processes and measurable effects or 
changes to human and biotic communities, that cycle back to 
effect driving forces. 
En route to a theory amenable to formal testing of the 
relationships between urban patterns and ecological 
resilience, Alberti and Marzluff  hypothesize that, as 
urbanization increases, natural vegetation decreases “until 
a point is reached where natural vegetation is too degraded 
and fragmented to perform vital ecological functions and 
the system becomes unstable” (2004: 244). As ecosystem 
functions decline, urbanization flips into a “sprawl state” 
where, for lack of information about the full costs to ecological 
systems from providing low-density development, a “forced” 
equilibrium, low in resilience, emerges. If allowed to continue 
in this state, urbanization may degrade ecosystem function to 
the point of collapse, unable to support the human population. 
That said, multiple equilibria are possible; resilience would 
suggest a steady state of co-existence, where human and 
ecological functions remain intact.
Infrastructure investments and land use policies are both 
driving forces for urban ecological change, and decisive factors 
in the anthropogenic flow of carbon into the atmosphere and 
resultant radiative forcing we now understand as climate 
change. Climate change is altering the pace, magnitude, and 
rate of change for multiple variables in biophysical processes, 
placing stress on ecological as well as urban systems, and 
bringing a sense of urgency to the quest for resilience. 
Infrastructure investments are often the subject of short-
term decision-making, despite their long-term and durable 
nature. The need to adapt to and mitigate climate change 
through infrastructure investment places an explicitly long-
term goal on what is, ultimately, a long-term investment.
6. RESIlIEnCE aS an opERaTIvE TERm foR 
InfRaSTRuCTuRE InvESTmEnTS
Researchers are beginning to use the term “resilience” to 
characterize the goal planners and decision makers should 
have when developing urban systems (Vale & Campanella, 
2005). Our world is dynamic and ever-changing, yet we build 
things that are static, unable to adapt to either forces of nature 
or deliberate acts of destruction. Buildings and infrastructure 
are designed to tolerate a limited set of changes over a given 
period of time. When stressed beyond those tolerances 
the structures that house our communities are subject to 
degradation and collapse. Resilience provides a framework 
for applying analytical techniques to anticipate the effects 
of disturbances under present and future circumstances. 
Emphasis is on the capacity to persist despite loss of life and 
property.
Infrastructure goods and services, and the organizations 
8 Whittington and Young | p8
J. Whittington & S. Young: Resilience through Transaction Cost Economic Evaluation
that manage them, likely differ in terms of their response, 
over time, to any given disturbance. Disturbances may be 
natural or man-made destabilizing forces, and are often 
the combination of many factors, including development. 
Development increases the severity of disasters from sudden 
change by either contributing to driving forces in a way that 
accelerates change, or putting more people and property 
at risk.  Development can precipitate sudden change, for 
instance, by destabilizing ecosystem functions. Gradual 
changes increase the probability of experiencing disaster 
from sudden changes, and our knowledge of these effects 
may give us more time to consider and launch alternative 
courses of action. 
In the course of conducting empirical research, ecologists 
find that populations of organisms can be resilient, persisting 
by absorbing or adapting to numerous changes, maintaining 
the same relationships with other populations or other 
variables, up to a point (Holling, 1973). There are limits that, 
when passed, cause dramatic and rapid change through the 
entire system. What remains is still a system, yet it does not 
function at the same state or in the same way. In particular, 
populations with the capacity to absorb or adapt to extreme 
fluctuations in given variables or parameters are believed to 
be resilient.8 When urban communities experience changes 
that surpass the thresholds that protective infrastructure 
or buildings can tolerate, they experience the system-wide 
destruction analogous in ecological research. The urban 
environment may recover and rebuild, though their elements 
and urban fabric may appear quite different than before. If 
measured, resilience would be the amount of disturbance 
a community can absorb without changing configuration; 
without moving to a “new” normal (Gunderson et al., 2009: 
xix). 
It is important to note that resilience and stability are not the 
same goals. Stable systems return as rapidly as possible, with 
the least fluctuation, to their original state (Holling, 1973). 
When our goal is stability, we manage against change. When 
our goal is resilience, we manage for change (Gunderson et al., 
1995). Resilient communities persist despite losses, adapting 
in the sense that they invest time and energy in infrastructure 
goods and services and other built environments that 
anticipate the forces that threaten to truly destabilize homes 
and ways of life.9 
Infrastructure is often imagined to serve the purpose of 
adapting to, or protecting against the effects of a changing 
climate. Yet, global models of climate change bring 
widespread uncertainty to local decision-makers charged 
with developing infrastructure. The science of predicting 
sea level rise, floods, droughts, extreme weather events, or 
urban heat island effect, operates most effectively over 100 
8  Or, on the scale of the ecosystem, redundancies in the niches occupied by 
various species may allow ecosystem functions to persist, at some level or 
form, after the loss of a species.
9  Nor is resilience synonymous with recovery. Investments in the built 
environment should be characterized as resilient to the extent that they 
result in less damage when disaster strikes, and thus raise less demand for 
investment during recovery.
years or more, at a global, or perhaps regional scale. For 
instance, recognition that the magnitude of these effects over 
a 100 year period hinge to a large extent on the amount of 
mitigation yet to be achieved, is leading the World Bank to 
develop new methodologies for determining the value of 
proposed infrastructure investments (Hallegate et al., 2012; 
Bonzanigo & Kalra, 2014). These methodologies diverge from 
the traditional practice of predicting the future and optimizing 
for that future. Instead, they examine how investment 
options might perform under a wide range of plausible future 
conditions.
Urban planning is central to determinations of what 
infrastructure to build and where to build it. We suspect that 
planning efforts could help urban environments gain a toehold 
in the climb to resilience by envisioning plausible future 
scenarios, engaging public participation, examining the likely 
consequences and options available when the tolerances of 
protective infrastructure are exceeded, and collecting local 
preferences for investment options in a systematic way. 
Planning for resilience would incorporate a preference for 
managing change, beyond typical limits or tolerances, in the 
design of infrastructure and other components of our built 
environments. 
7.  Ex post EvaluaTIon of hISToRICal 
InvESTmEnT
As noted above, transaction cost analysis of historical 
infrastructure investments have focused on the cost-
effectiveness of transactions from the buyer’s and seller’s 
point of view. Analysis could, however, be expanded to include 
costs experienced by third parties, such as environmental 
externalities. Furthermore, while transaction cost analysis 
of historical infrastructure investments have focused on 
the cost-effectiveness of the choice of contract, the scope 
of analysis could be expanded to take into account the cost 
consequences of the choice of what and where to build.
Transaction cost economics theorizes that institutional 
arrangements economize by safeguarding against hazards. 
For any given infrastructure investment one could ask, what 
are we safeguarding against? Resilience would suggest that 
we design infrastructure to address potential hazards, such 
as floods, droughts, or earthquakes, and climate change 
elevates attention to some hazards more than others. Also, 
there are multiple infrastructure design and planning options 
for addressing any given hazard. In the case of floods, for 
instance, one can contemplate unprotected development, 
basins or wetlands to absorb flows, barriers of various types 
and materials, the elevation of structures, or retreat to 
higher ground. Transaction cost analysis for resilience would 
compare these investment options for the safeguards they 
provide for human and ecological functions, amassing an 
array of alternatives, along Williamson’s schema.
Recall that, in Williamson’s theory of economic organization 
(Figure 1), the safeguards provided by forms of organization, 
from market to hybrid to hierarchy, become more expensive to 


























execute as one walks down the schema. This is a compelling 
economic theory, because economizing is possible when 
more elaborate and thus expensive safeguards are reserved 
for more hazardous transactions. Resilience, however, is an 
aim achievable only with respect to the highest plausible level 
of hazard. 
Our theory and schema differentiate short-term from long-
term economizing. In our theory of economic investment for 
resilience, investment options provide more resilience, in 
the form of protection from expensive, irreversible damage, 
as one walks down the schema. Economizing in the short-
term would characterize investments in the upper end of the 
schema, at risk of total loss. Long-term economizing would 
occur when designs and accompanying planning policies 
provide resilience in the face of a plausible extreme hazard. 
Measures of cost would, in keeping with the aim of resilience, 
expand to include a longer timeframe for historical analysis 
than is customary in transaction cost analysis. The designed 
life and path dependent nature of infrastructure would suggest 
that the timeframe of analysis for resilience should be at least 
the designed lifespan of the infrastructure. If the history of 
investment allows a 100 year span of ex post analysis, this 
may be a convenient time frame, given the plausibility of much 
greater magnitudes of hazards from climate change over the 
long-term (Hallegate et al., 2012).
The unit of analysis, the transaction, would consist of 
investment in a particular infrastructure project or system, 
and the governance structure would consist of the bundle of 
rules governing investment and land use over the long-term. 
The governance structures would be independent variables, 
and a long-term cost-based measure of resilience would be 
the dependent variable. To be comparable, infrastructure 
investment transactions would have to be selected to control 
for the form of hazard to which they are exposed, and a few 
general physical properties of the sites where they are located, 
such as the steepness of slopes and geologic conditions that 
drive up the cost of engineered solutions and thus generate 
extraneous variance.10
Organized in this way, empirical ex post analysis would 
reveal resilience in the form of comparative long-term cost-
effectiveness of historical infrastructure options. In particular, 
this approach would highlight the inefficiency of infrastructure 
investment choices which may have appeared to be cost-
effective in the short-term, but have proven to be relatively 
expensive over the long-term.11 This would especially be the 
10  Similarly, Whittington’s (2012) research design involved checking the 
selection of comparable cases to control for the features in the design 
of highway projects known to skew costs, such as area of the footprint, 
mass of structure, surface area of bridge, and area of wall. In that analysis, 
form of contract was the independent variable and cost outcome was the 
dependent variable.
11  Through empirical ex post analysis of historical investments, this schema may 
show how some designs and plans which appear elaborate and expensive 
in the short-term, are more cost-effective over the long-term than their 
counterparts, because of the safeguards they provide. Similarly, the theory 
and schema may show how some designs and plans that seem politically 
infeasible because of their implications for property rights, prove to protect 
human and ecological assets more effectively over the long-term.
case for designs that failed prematurely, as in infrastructural 
investments that became sources of or subject to disaster, 
resulting in expensive or irreversible costs to human and 
ecological functions, due to the inability of the investment to 
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Figure 3: Infrastructure Planning, Disaster and Re-Investment. 
Source: Authors
In keeping with Williamson’s theory of economic organization, 
transaction costs would be attributed to ex post maladaptation. 
Production and transaction costs would be counted. The 
hypothesis of discriminating alignment would remain in place. 
The unit of analysis is still the transaction, cost-effective 
in discriminating alignment with a governance structure 
that safeguards against the hazards of bounded rationality 
and opportunism in the presence of asset specificity. 
Williamson’s remediableness criterion would still apply, as 
only institutionally feasible options are applicable.
The incorporation of the theory of resilience shifts the 
research question from the “make or buy” decision to the 
“risk or resilience” decision. It also stretches the time horizon 
of applicable analysis over as long as 100 year timespan, or 
at least as long as the designed life of the infrastructure 
investment. Emphasis is on the behavioral assumption of 
bounded rationality, leaving actors with imperfect foresight 
and allowing, in a game-theoretic conception of decision-
making, for the appearance of gambling with long-term risk in 
a short-term game of infrastructure investment. Production 
and transaction costs are both accounted for, with transaction 
costs that account for the expenses and losses experienced 
to the infrastructure investment and human and ecological 
functions over the long-term. Transaction costs are excessive 
long-term losses, and resilience is thus the relative measure 
of long-term cost-effectiveness of the choice of infrastructure 
investment. Discriminating alignment is the choice of 
governance structure that economizes over the long-term, 
providing resilience. When searching for a remedy, only 
institutionally feasible options need apply.
8.  Ex AntE analySIS of alTERnaTIvE 
fuTuRE DEvElopmEnT planS 
Climate change is creating global demand for empirical 
information that can be used to guide local investment in 
infrastructure toward outcomes that make effective use of 
limited resources over the long-term and prove resilient by 
safeguarding against disruption to human and ecological 
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functions. The aim of empirical analysis of historical 
investment would be to amass predictive content by naming 
the key ways in which transactions involving infrastructure 
investment differ, describing the economic properties of the 
structures employed to govern investment and land use over 
the long-term, and measuring the comparative costs parties 
experienced from these choices. To be of use in the analysis 
of alternative future development plans, ex post analysis 
would have to provide the types of empirical information that 
would be of strategic use to local decision-makers as they 
attempt to reconcile uncertainty about the exogenous forces 
created by climate change with knowledge of the endogenous 
limitations of existing physical and financial assets.
The methodology likely to elucidate the value of empirical 
transaction cost analysis for resilience, and support its use 
in deciding amongst infrastructure investment options, is a 
modified method of decision-making for robustness from 
operations research and modern systems theory. Jonathan 
Rosenhead (2001) explains that robust methodologies 
support decision-making when “there is radical uncertainty 
about the future, and where decisions can or must be staged 
sequentially”; it aims to resolve the problem of future 
uncertainty by organizing decisions “in terms of the attractive 
future options that they keep open” (2001: 181).
Although infrastructure investments are endogenous to local 
decision-makers, they are also, as noted above, driving forces 
in urban ecological models of land use and land cover change. 
They are often the first of multiple sequential investments 
that collectively serve as precipitating events, with resulting 
measurable impacts to human and biotic communities. 
Empirical analysis of historical investments and their long-
term consequences can be used to determine parameters 
for decisions, and populate decision-trees with scenarios of 
alternative future infrastructure investments. To illustrate, 
we have populated one such decision-tree from Rosenhead 
(2001) with hypothetical values (Figure 4). 
Moving from left to right, diamond 1 represents the policy 
objective the infrastructure investment is meant to deliver. 
Diamonds 2-5 are four alternative infrastructure investment 
options, which are precursors to the plausible changes 
in land use differentiated by diamonds 6-14. Together, 
the patterns of infrastructure and land use investment 
expressed in diamonds 2-14 can be linked to end states, 
measurable in terms of the qualities ascribed economic 
value in human and biotic communities, identified by boxes 
15-31. Up to this point, the items identified are treated as 
endogenous variables, subject to the governance structures 
and range of institutionally feasible infrastructure and land 
Figure 4: A three-stage planning problem with multiple futures. Source: Adapted from Rosenhead (2001: 196) (copyright 
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alternative governance structures would provide an empirical 
basis for delineating the plausible precipitating effects of each 
infrastructure decision on land use, and measuring the effect 
of each pattern of urban development in terms of plausible end 
states. Importantly, empirical analysis would help decision-
makers avoid optimism bias by presenting empirical cases, 
with measured impacts to human and biotic communities, of 










Figure 5: A simple matrix with parameters describing infrastructure 
investment alternatives. Source: Authors
From Rosenhead’s (2001) explanation, we gather that when 
the decision-tree is complete, the decision options (diamonds 
2-5) can be comparatively assessed using robustness scores 
across each future state. For example, moving from left to 
right across Figure 4, if one were to select the infrastructure 
investment represented by diamond 2 (as in Figure 5, a 
conventional infrastructure project at location “A”), this 
investment could result in two land use changes (diamonds 
6 and 7). Together, these patterns of development across 
the landscape could result in five measurable end states 
(boxes 15, 16, 17, 19, and 22). For each initial infrastructure 
investment, robustness is measured as the proportion of 
plausible end states with desirable or acceptable impact in 
each future state, while debility is measured as the proportion 
of end states with undesirable or catastrophic impact in each 
future state (Figure 6).
The robustness matrix, with desirable and acceptable scores, 
shows that these decisions are roughly comparable in terms 
of their odds of producing positive outcomes. In contrast, 
measures of unacceptable or catastrophic outcomes in the 
debility matrix suggest that decision 3 (“green” infrastructure 
at location “A”) would be more likely to avoid unacceptable 
long-term costs, and thus prove more resilient. Working 
back through Figure 4, one can even imagine accompanying 
infrastructure investment option 3 with changes to land use 
policy designed to avoid catastrophic (box 21) and undesirable 
(box 19) end states, by regulating against one particular form 
of land use change (diamond 8).
Transaction cost economic evaluations of historical 
investments in infrastructure would allow one to populate 
these matrices with estimates of actual costs from empirical 
accounts of historical damage resulting from various hazards. 
The simple ordinal values that describe desirable, acceptable, 
undesirable, or catastrophic outcomes, in the matrices of 
Figure 6 would be replaced by economic values, or other more 
fine-grained ordinal scales of benefit and cost. In this way, one 
could use empirical transaction cost analyses of historical 
use developments.12 Exogenous hazards are represented by 
the columns of boxes (Fi) aligned with each end state. Each 
column represents a hazard experienced in a future state, and 
numerical values in the boxes are used to indicate the positive 
and negative impact to each valued end state from exposure 
to the hazard.
When urban planning influences infrastructure investment, 
the range of options for investment is quite wide, limited 
only by one’s capacity to envision the plausible effects 
of alternative arrangements of local assets and policies 
in relation to preferences. The parameters for deciding 
what and where to build (i.e. diamonds 2-5) could be quite 
simple, suggesting alternative locations for infrastructure 
investments and alternative forms, some conventional and 
“grey” with others more “green” in their components and 
intended functions (Figure 5). Historical analysis of the long-
term effects of various infrastructure investments under 
12  In the absence of hazards, this methodology can be used to gauge the 
preferences stakeholders have for alternative infrastructure investments 
based on plausible scenarios of future urban development patterns 
and end states. Thus, the stakeholders would be represented by Fi, and 
their preferences would be indicated by the values shown in the boxes 
below. Positive values are desirable, negative values are end states 
the stakeholders would prefer to avoid, and questions suggest that the 
















































































































Debility matrix (on sets U and C)
Figure 6: Option maintenance analysis. Source: Adapted from 
Rosenhead (2001: 197) (copyright © 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd).
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infrastructure investments for resilience to populate ex ante 
evaluations of alternative future plans for development.
9. mEaSuRIng DEvElopmEnT foR 
SuSTaInabIlITy 
The organization of science toward the pragmatic and 
challenging pursuit of sustainable development depends on 
methodologies and designs for research that unite empirical 
evidence of the environmental and economic consequences of 
our investments, support the norms of scientific production, 
and offer hope of predictive content. Transaction cost 
economics and resilience offer opportunities to do so through 
theoretical approaches and research methodologies that 
make common cause of research designed to reveal, in 
transaction cost economic terms, the long-term efficiency 
of investments in systems of infrastructure that complement 
and incorporate valuable environmental assets. These are 
well-developed theories, each of which has a history of 
application to infrastructure systems. If we can expand our 
concept of transactions in search of long-term value, we may 
see more than economic rewards.
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